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An empirical study on the contractual risk allocation provisions and 
indemnity and hold harmless clauses in the oilfield service contracts in 
Malaysia 
 
Wan M. Zulhafiz 248
 
School of Law, University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom; and 
Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University Malaysia 
 
Oil and gas projects are risky undertakings, which may cause severe damage to property and the 
environment, not to mention, personal injury and death to personnel. Contractual provision such 
as an indemnity and mutual hold harmless clause is used as a tool in allocating the risks. Most oil 
companies, in their task to manage the risks, seek to depart from the traditional form of risk 
allocation e.g. knock-for-knock indemnity regime. In this respect, there is a tendency that the oil 
companies will pass a greater share of the risks onto contractors. This problem could lead to 
financial impairment and unfairness to the contractors. An empirical study was conducted to 
investigate the issues and problems with regard to risk allocation provisions and indemnity and 
hold harmless clauses ofoilfield service contracts in Malaysia. The data for the empirical study 
was drawn from the intensive semi-structured interviews of ten respondents from oil companies, 
contractors and one legal practitioner. The finding of this empirical study indicates that contractors 
are concerned about the one-way adversarial style of operator-contractor relationshipandalso that 
                                                          
248 The author is an academic trainee at Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University Malaysia 
and currently pursuing a PhD at School of Law, University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom. 
they arebeing allocated more contractual risks. The methodology employed in this paper will 
essentially be a combination of literature review and semi-structured interview, which will be 
carried out in aprescriptive and analytic manner. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
An empirical study was conducted in Malaysia during the period of February until April 2014 to 
elicit the opinion of the key players in the oil and gas industry regarding the issue of risk allocation 
provisions, their attitudes towards the current trends of indemnity clauses under oilfield service 
contracts in Malaysia as well as their perspective on how to addressing this problem. Korobkin 
suggests that the study of actual contracting practice is useful ‘to describe in-depth the contracting 
patterns and norms generally followed by a particular type or group of contracting party.’249 Eigen 
suggests that empirical study of contracts have a significant tradition in legal scholarship because 
it helps ‘to understand the diversity of disciplinary approaches and framings of questions about 
contracts raised in modern empirical explorations’ and it is valuable to articulate concisely the 
inter-relationship between contract doctrine, theory and empirics.250The following discussionwill 
be rooted in three major theories, i.e. the concept of contractual risk allocation and indemnity 
clause, the theory of freedom of contract, the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power and 
fairness, have become the underlying principles in the whole processes of this study.  
 
2.0 Research Design 
 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with five companies representing the contractor, 
as well as, one company and one legal firm representing the operator. The respondents are the legal 
manager, the contract managers, the procurement managers, the principal technical officer, the 
project manager of the companies, as well as the legal practitioner who handles litigation for the 
operator in court. The contractors were selected from three different ranges of size i.e. big, medium 
and small companies. The respondents were chosen due to their prominence and experience in 
contractual matters. The big companies were usually equipped with complete legal and contract 
departments. Whereas, the medium size company might have a legal department, but would not 
necessarily have a contract department because the contractual matters would be managed by an 
engineer who would also be the principal technical officer. On the other hand, most of the small 
companies neither had a legal department nora contract department. Therefore, the procurement 
manager who came from a technical background would manage the contractual matters. There 
were some difficulties in getting appointments with the respondents, especially the operators, who 
were quite reluctant and not easily accessible. The summary of the respondents is tabled as follows:  
 
 
                                                          
249Russell Korobkin. 'Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls' (2002) U.Ill.L.Rev. 1033 
250Zev Eigen. 'Empirical studies of contract' (2012) Annual Review of Law and Social Science, forthcoming 12 
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3.0 Result and Analysis 
 
In general, ranges of risk allocation clauses are commonly seen in contracts used in the oil and gas 
industry including indemnity and hold harmless clauses, clauses excluding liability for 
‘consequential loses’ and clauses limiting overall liability.251 The actual sharing of risk, 
indemnities and provisions for supporting insurance is usually determined by the wording of the 
relevant contract documents.252Semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to ascertain 
the industry’s perceptionof risk allocation of its current practice in Malaysia.Many contractors 
consider such non-negotiable contracts to be problematic, primarily because they often contain 
onerous provisions in important areas such as allocation of risk.253 This cancreate significant risk 
exposures.254In distributing the risk between the operator and contractor, one of the respondents 
claimed that the contractors usually gained the least benefit and expressed their dissatisfaction at 
being made to indemnify the operators’ negligence. This can be seen in the following remark made 
by one of the respondent, 
 “Supposedly, anything that are risky to us, then we need to take steps to mitigate such risks 
or deviate from such terms and conditions. However, most of the time, the contractor 
always be at the losing end, this is because in order to secure a big job, whether the 
contractors like it or not, the contractors have to meet the operator’s demand and must get 
ready to take those risks…The problem with the indemnity clause is that, when the operator 
transfers their liabilities to us by asking us indemnify it and even though it was happened 
due to their negligence.”255  
The respondent also claimed that the indemnity clauses were one-sided. This was because,the bulk 
of contractual liability, in respect of the indemnity clauses, was placed on the contractors. The 
general practice is that responsibility for such risk should rest with the party best able to manage 
it, e.g. the party with the relevant insurance coverage.256It is suggested that insuring or 
                                                          
251 Greg Gordon, 'Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Contracts' in Greg Gordon, John Paterson and Emre Usenmez (eds), 
Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice & Emerging Trends (2nd edn Dundee University, 2011) p.443 
252 Leslie Edwards, Practical risk management in the construction industry (Thomas Telford, 1995) 
253 Wan Zulhafiz. 'Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977: does it provide a good model in regulating risk allocation 
provisions in oilfield contracts in Malaysia?' (2015) 8 Int J Trade and Global Markets 3 
254 Cary A. Moomjian. 'Drilling Contract Historical Development and Future Trends Post-Macondo: Reflections on a 
35 Year Industry Career' (IADC/SPE Drilling Conference and Exhibition Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2012) 
255 Respondent 5 from Contractor C 
256Leslie Edwards, 'Practical risk management in the construction industry' in (Thomas Telford, 1995) 
Categories 
of Units of 
Analysis 
Respondents 
No 
Units of 
Analysis 
Designation 
No. of 
Respondents 
Contractor 
1 Contractor A 1 Legal Manager+ 1 Contract Manager 2 
2 Contractor B 1 Legal Manager+ 1 Contract Manager 2 
3 Contractor C 1 Legal Manager+ 1 Principal Technical 2 
4 Contractor D 1 Procurement Manager 1 
5 Contractor E 1 Procurement Manager 1 
Operator 
 
6 Operator A 1 Project Manager 1 
7 Legal Firm Z 1 Legal Practitioner 1  
Total Number of Respondents 10 
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contractually transferring the risk to the insurer and leaving the premium to settle any charges to 
the other party could mitigate risk exposure; it is in fact the most economically beneficial and 
practical way for the risk to be dealt with.257 Insurance is used by the indemnitor as a risk cushion 
in a situation when he is responsible for his own employees and equipment. The insurance in fact 
is the underlying driver in this case rather than the ancillary tool for risk management.258 This is 
common for super-majors, who tempt to self-insure and minimize transaction costs.259 But this 
reason is not applicable to some contractors, as they cannot afford self-insurance. On this point 
one respondent commented, 
“The indemnity clauses mostly are one sided. The contractors would be made to be liable 
for most of the liabilities, for example the indemnity with regards to property and 
equipment of the operators, the third party liability, not to mention pollution. Usually we 
try to keep it and make it consistent with the insurance coverage, for example per 
occurrence how much we'll be liable. Usually it is always unlimited liability and most of 
the time the clients refuse to negotiate on that as well.”260 
It is argued that the practicalities of risk allocation should be limited by certain basic requirements 
for those to whom risk is being transferred. These requirements would be, for example,the ability 
to undertake a hazardous task, willingness to take the risk, financial capability of the company to 
deal with the risk in the event that a disaster occurs, continued existence and adequate finance 
during the period of liability.261 It is also argued that the responsibility for indemnifying the 
consequences of a risk event resulting from the activities of one of the contracting parties should 
ideally rest with the party who has control over that risk.262The Operator is always in the best 
position to control the risk. Operators have confirmed that both quantified risk and unquantified 
risk including indemnity would be transferred to contractors.They maintained that it is the 
responsibility of the contractor to understand and convert the risk into monitories. On this point, 
one of the respondentssaid, 
“As operator, all the quantified risk will be transferred to contractor and stated in contract. 
The contractors are to put the price of each risk identified in contract. It is responsibility of 
contractor to understand and convert the risk into monitories…The risks are made clear to 
contractor. Contractor will put the prices for those scope specified in the contract. Any risk 
is to be priced by contractor…Uncounted quantity will use reimbursable cost plus… 
Indemnity scope is to be taken by contractor; cost of premium for indemnity will be claim 
to operator.”  
However, the contractor would end up having to take upthe risk and cost the risk into the price. 
On this matter, one of therespondent commented 
“Let say, there are some conditions that we could not afford to accept them in the event the 
operators attempt to shift greater risks to the us – now the operators go for competitive bids 
so our chances to be awarded is lesser if we stick to our qualification.”263 
                                                          
257Max Abrahamson. 'Risk Management' (1984) 2 ICLR 241 
258 Caledonia North Sea Ltd. v British Telecommunications Plc same v Kelvin International Services Ltd. same v London 
Bridge Engineering Ltd. same v Norton (No. 2) Ltd. (In Liquidation) same v Pickup No. 7 Ltd. same v Stena Offshore 
Ltd. same v Wood Group Engineering Contractors Ltd. - [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 553 
259 BP Annual Report and Accounts 2007, p.39  
260 Respondent 3 from Contractor B 
261Leslie Edwards, 'Practical risk management in the construction industry' in (Thomas Telford, 1995) 
262ibid 
263 Respondent 3 from Contractor B 
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Another commented that, 
“However, we are not in the position to change the conditions, so what we normally do is, 
we will take note on that and accordingly advise to our technical people, “please calculate 
this risk into your cost”. Well, the thing is that, the operators would not entertain if we put 
so much qualification in the contracts. Sometimes, the operator is just going say, “if you 
can't comply and you have a lot of exceptions to the clauses, then you will be disqualified”. 
As a result, we are not going to get the job.”264 
The contractor would be facing a problem to set an ideal price after absorbing the risk, 
“…We need to set the price. The price should be an ideal one. Not too high as there is 
possibility our submission would be rejected, but not too low to the extent that it might 
jeopardies our profit.”265 
Nevertheless, due to the high competitive bid, the contractor faces a dilemma in relation to setting 
the price. On one hand the contractor is afraid of not getting the job if the price is too high after 
converting the risk into monitories. On the other handhe fears financial difficulty if the price he 
sets is too low. On this point, one of the respondents observed, 
“Usually, in order to mitigate the risks, we have to cost in the impact into pricing. Whatever 
the risks involved, the cost has to be reflected in the pricing. Sometimes, this would be a 
problem, when we were trying to cost in everything, the cost will be too high and we afraid 
that we are not going to get the job. But, if we neglect the risks now, then if anything 
happen in future, the risks would be at our own cost. So, it is real challenge for us to draw 
a middle line between these two.”266 
A contract could be regarded‘as a trade-off between the contractor’s price for undertaking the work 
and his willingness to accept both the controllable and uncontrollable risks.’267However, 
contractual agreements should be concluded taking into account who should bear the burden of 
risk and also how much risk each party would take.268 It is imperative to note that an improper 
tender style and unreasonable risk burden could be the primary reasonof contractual disputes 
between the parties. It is claimed that the main factor for increase of overall cost is due to the usage 
of disclaimer clausessuch as indemnity clauses, in allocating risk.269 This is because, once the risk 
is transferred to the contractor and ‘the contractor has no means by which to control the occurrence 
or outcome of the risk, the contractor must either insure against it or add a contingency to the bid 
price.’270 The cost of transferring risk to the contractor through such clauses carries hidden costs 
such as ‘restricted bid competition, increased potential for claims and disputes and above all, more 
adversarial owner–contractor relationships.’271 One of the respondents who is a practicing lawyer 
                                                          
264 Respondent 1 from Contractor A 
265 Respondent 4 from Contractor B 
266 Respondent 3 from Contractor B 
267 Ka Chi Lam and others. 'Modelling risk allocation decision in construction contracts' (2007) 25(5) Int J Project 
Manage 485 
268Latif Onur Uğur. 'İnşaat Sektöründe Riskler ve Risk Yönetimi' (2006) Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği Yayını, Ankara 
p.120 
269F. Hartman. 'Construction dispute resolution through an improved contracting process in the Canadian context.' 
(PhD thesis Loughborough University of Technology, UK 1993) ;G. Jergeas and F. Hartman. 'A contract clause for 
allocating risk' (1996) Transaction of the American Association of Cost Engineers ;J. G. Zack Jr. '"Risk-Sharing" - Good 
concept, bad name' (1996) 38(7) Cost Engineering (Morgantown, West Virginia) 26 
270GF Jergeas and FT Hartman. 'Contractors' Protection Against Construction Claims' (Annual Meeting-American 
Association of Cost Engineers American Association of Cost Engineers (AACE), 1994) 8 
271 D. Becker. 'The cost of general conditions' (1993) (September) Am Assoc Cost Eng Trans 7 
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and used to litigate on behalf of the operator shared her perspective on this issue. She commented 
that, 
“I assume when the contractors signed the contract, the contractors were fully aware of 
those liabilities that they will be carrying on. So, if anything happen in future, I think it is 
their obligation to get protection for those liabilities by way of insurance. Plus, the parties 
are able to practice contractual freedom. I don’t see any problem with regard to this matter, 
unless, there is issue with regard to fairness, but such allegation should be proven by 
separate cause of action and proper hearing in court.” 
It is true that as a matter of contractual freedom, the parties may freely decide the terms of the 
contract including the risk allocation provisions.272 However, the lawyermight not be aware that, 
in the industry, during the contract formation process, there exists inequality of bargaining power 
between the parties, which means that contractual freedom has not been exercised properly. As a 
result,the contract is one-sided and the risk is not shared fairly between the parties. The contractors 
are actually aware of the situation, but they are neither in the position to change or qualify any of 
the terms nor given opportunity to discuss or negotiate on the allocation of the risk. One of the 
respondents gave the following remark, to describe the situation, 
“The most we can do is to voice our dissatisfaction to the clients. Sometimes they may 
listen to us, unfortunately most of the time they are not. How would we mitigate? Basically 
it is good to have both parties to sit down and explain and discuss about the risks involved 
in each project. But I suppose they are going to say that, it is them who invest money, thus 
they will not accept any of our qualification with regard to the risks.”  
In some occasion, the contractor may have to indemnify the operatorfor the operator’s negligence 
in respect of operator’spersonnel and property, or vice versa.273The adjustment of the indemnity 
clause would undermine the traditional risk allocation ofa “knock-for-knock” indemnity 
regime.274As a result, ‘it is likely that the existence of negligence may first have to be proved in 
the courts for an indemnity to operate, which defeats one of the primary objectives of the knock-
for-knock regime.’275Moreover, such adjustment may also represent uninsurable risk to the 
contractor.276 Furthermore, this would give rise to the possibility of increased costs since the 
contractor attempts to insure a risk where he does not have a real insurable interest.277 One of the 
respondents discussed on this scenario,  
“We always have problem when it comes to indemnity clause. We are expected to bear 
most of the liabilities. The worst part is that, sometimes they (operators) expect us to be 
liable for something which is due to their faults. Could you imagine that? But, what can we 
say; we have no choice but to agree with such clause. It is always be the case, either that 
we take or leave it…The risks have to be covered by insurance. We do not afford to take 
the risks without any financial back up from the insurance company… This is the problem. 
                                                          
272 Privy Council in Ooi Boon Leong v. Citibank N.A. [1984] 1 MLJ 222, confirmed that “parties to an agreement have 
much scope to negotiate and incorporate terms acceptable to them” 
273 Helen Franklin. 'Irretrievable Breakdown? A Review of Operator/Contractor Relationships in the Offshore Oil and 
Gas Industry' (2005) 23(1) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law  
274 ibid 
275 ibid 
276 ibid 
277 ibid 
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Sometimes, we have to absorb all risk regardless whether such risk is being covered by the 
insurance company.”278 
From the contractors’ point of view, more often than not, the risk is not one that can be passed on 
to the subcontractors.279Where offshore exploitation is concerned, the contractor would usually 
cap his liabilityby stating that he has little to no controlof the catastrophic risks, such asblowout, 
explosion and pollution emanating from the reservoir.280This is because,without the liability 
capsthe contractor maybe made responsible to bear most of the uninsured risk.In that event, such 
risk may be disproportionate to the scope, size and profit margin on the contract.281Nevertheless, 
the quid pro quo for insurance coverage by the operator is that, the contractor should be willing to 
expose his insuranceto the benefit of the operator. It was argued that, ‘it is not reasonable to expect 
limitation of, and/or indemnity from, catastrophic and third party risks to the extent that the 
contractor’s own insurance would in fact respond.’282On this issue, one of the respondents 
commented, 
“Again, the indemnity clauses mostly are one sided. The contractors would be made to be 
liable for most of the liabilities, for example the indemnity with regards to property and 
equipment of the operators, the third party liability, not to mention pollution. Usually we 
try to keep it and make it consistent with the insurance coverage, for example per 
occurrence how much we'll be liable. Usually it is always unlimited liability and most of 
the time the clients refuse to negotiate on that as well.”283 
In order to combat this problem, some of the respondents suggested that fairness could be achieved 
ifthe legislator passes a law to protect the contractors’ affairs284 while another respondent 
suggested that legal protection should come from an anti-indemnity law. Building on this 
suggestion, one responded commented, 
“I know that in US, they have oilfield anti-indemnity law, but I am not quite sure how far 
does the law really efficient to address this issue. What I can confirm, we have nothing yet 
in Malaysia to that effect. To certain extent, I think yes, we need rules by the government 
to solve the problem with regards to indemnity clauses.”285 
While, anothercommented that the legislator in Malaysia should issue guidelines in order to 
monitor this problemwhich would work back-to-backwith thePetroleum Act.286 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the fact that there is no law to regulate the current imbalance of risk allocation and 
unfair indemnity clauses in oilfield service contracts should be perceived as a serious problem. 
This problem is caused by inequality of bargaining power between operators and contractors, 
which itself arises from thedominant position held by the operators over the contractors. It is 
observed that these alarming problems deserve attention from the authorities. It is crucial that the 
                                                          
278 Respondent 1 from Contractor A 
279 Franklin (n26) 
280 ibid 
281 ibid 
282ibid 
283 Respondent 3 from Contractor B 
284 Respondent 5 from Contractor C 
285 Respondent 3 from Contractor B 
286 Respondent 7 from Contractor E 
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authorities act because this problem could potentially threaten the commercial development of the 
oil and gas industry in Malaysia. Even though insurance provisions are sometimes provided in the 
contract, there are no guidelines available for the parties. Moreover, the insurance requirements 
have not been made mandatory to the parties. This could cause the contractor to assume uninsured 
risks, which could lead to detrimental financial exposure in the event of a catastrophic incident. 
This problem could be made worse if the contractors have to assume double jeopardy contractual 
risk, whereby the contractors not only need to assume the risk from the operators but also from the 
sub-contractors. In order to solve this problem, it is argued that a specific legal mechanism should 
be adopted in Malaysia to protect and limit the liability of the contractors under the oilfield service 
contracts. 
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